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Abstract 
 
We analyse the determinants of annual net income and wages (annual net income/hours) of general 
practitioners (GPs) using a unique, anonymised, non-disclosive dataset derived from tax returns for 
21,657 GPs in England for the financial year 2002/3. The average GP had a gross income of 
£189,300, incurred expenses of £115,600, and earned an annual net income of £73,700. The mean 
wage was £35 per hour. Net income and wages depended on gender, experience, list size, 
partnership size, whether or not the GP worked in a dispensing practice, whether or not they worked 
in a Primary Medical Service (PMS) practice, and the characteristics of the local population (limiting 
long term illness rate, proportion from ethnic minorities, population density, Index of Multiple 
Deprivation 2000). The findings have implications for discrimination by GP gender and country of 
qualification, economies of scale by practice size, incentives for competition for patients, 
compensating differentials for local population characteristics, and the attractiveness of PMS versus 
General Medical Services contracts.  
 
JEL No.s: I11, J31, J44 
 
Keywords.  Physician, family.  General practitioner. Income. Wages. Contract.  
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1. Introduction 
 
There were 29,340 general practitioners (GPs) working for the National Health Service (NHS) in 
England in September 2005 (NHS Staff 1995-2005 database, 2008). Most GPs are independent 
contractors organised in small partnerships, often owning their practice premises. Each practice has a 
list of registered NHS patients. GPs are paid under one of two contracts. At the time of our study in 
2002/3 around 80% were in practices with a nationally negotiated General Medical Services (GMS) 
contract under which they which they were paid by a mixture of capitation, lump sum allowances, 
items of service, and target incentives (NHS Staff 1995-2005 database, 2008). Capitation payments 
varied with the age of patients and with the deprivation level of the area in which they lived.  
 
GPs had to meet all practice expenses from their gross income, except for some specific 
reimbursements for the costs of practice nurses. The levels of the payments under the GMS contract 
were set by the Doctors and Dentists Review Body to achieve a national target average net income, 
called Intended Average Net Income. GPs could influence their income via the number of registered 
patients, items delivered under fee-for-service, and achievement of target payments. Additionally, 
where there was no local pharmacy GPs were permitted to dispense the medicines they prescribed. 
Dispensing practices can make a profit from dispensing since they receive a dispensing fee per item 
and are reimbursed for the drugs they buy at a rate which often exceeds the price they paid.  
 
In 2002/3 around 20% of GPs had Primary Medical Services (PMS) contracts negotiated between the 
practice and the local Primary Care Trust (PCT). Under a PMS contract the practice received a lump 
sum in exchange for agreeing to provide the services they would have provided under the GMS 
contract, plus additional services for particular patient groups. The amount received was typically the 
amount the practice would have received under GMS, plus an addition intended to cover the cost of 
the extra services. As under GMS, each practice had to meet its expenses from its gross income, but 
around 8% of PMS GPs (NHS Staff 1995-2005 database, 2008) were directly employed by their PCT 
and received a fixed salary, bearing no practice expenses.   
 
The way in which the pay of GPs varies with their contract type, as well as other personal, practice, 
and patient characteristics has considerable relevance for policy (Wordsworth et al., 2004), and has 
also received much attention in the media (see, e.g., BBC website, 2008a, 2008b). However, 
research on GPs’ pay is sparse. The little evidence that exists is based on the UK-wide GP Earnings 
and Expenses Enquiry (EEQ) published each year by the Technical Steering Committee of the NHS 
Information Centre for Health and Social Care (GP Earnings and Expenses Enquiry, 2008). This is 
used to support GP contract negotiations between the NHS Confederation (the employers) and the 
British Medical Association (the doctors’ trade union). It focuses predominantly on univariate analyses 
of mean annual gross income, expenses and net income earned by GPs, stratified by whether GPs 
are contracted or salaried, their contractual status (PMS versus GMS), and their dispensing status. 
The EEQ does not generally include multivariate analyses of GP earnings, nor does it consider hours 
worked or wages.  
 
We use a unique, anonymised, non-disclosive dataset on GP gross income and expenses derived 
from tax returns held at Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HRMC) and undertake three types of 
analysis. First, we use multiple regression analysis to investigate how GP, practice, and local 
population characteristics affect GPs’ net income, gross income and expenses. Second, we combine 
HRMC data with estimates of GP hours derived from a national sample survey of GPs to calculate 
hourly wages (net income/estimated hours). We estimate multiple regression models of the 
relationship between wages and individual, practice, and local population characteristics. Third, we 
examine in more detail the way in which the type of practice contract (PMS versus GMS) affects GP 
wages. We decompose the observed log wage differentials due to the contract into the portion due to 
differences in characteristics (providing information on the characteristics of practices who had 
switched to PMS) and the portion due to differences in coefficients (providing information on the 
incentives for practices with given characteristics to switch). 
 
We consider the implications of our analysis for a number of policy questions: 
 
x Government plans for the NHS require a substantial increase in the supply of labour from GPs 
(Department of Health, 2000). In 2004, 39% of GPs were female and 19% qualified overseas 
(NHS Staff 1995-2005 database, 2008). There is evidence of gender and ethnic pay 
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discrimination in other labour markets (see, e.g., Bell and Ritchie, 1998; Connolly and Gregory 
2002, 2007). Since pay has a substantial influence on labour supply it is of interest to know if 
female or overseas qualified GPs are paid less than otherwise similar male and UK qualified 
GPs.  
x Between 1995 and 2004 the proportion of single handed GP practices fell from 0.32 to 0.27 and 
the average number of GPs per practice increased from 3.0 to 3.7. Government policy has been 
accused of attempting to reduce the number of single handed practitioners (Smith, 2004). We 
investigate whether the trend to larger practices might be explained in part by the impact of 
practice size on GP income.  
x There is policy concern over inequalities in the geographical distribution of GPs, and there has 
been little change in the extent of inequality over the past 30 years (Gravelle and Sutton, 2001; 
Hann and Gravelle, 2004). One reason might be that the remuneration system does not provide 
sufficient pay differentials to compensate GPs for working in less attractive areas. We therefore 
examine the extent to which GPs’ pay varies with the characteristics of the areas in which they 
work.  
x From 1998 GPs have been able to choose between the traditional nationally negotiated GMS 
contract and a locally negotiated PMS contract. By 2004 36% of GPs had opted to switch to the 
PMS contract. We investigate whether PMS GPs had higher incomes, thus possibly explaining 
this trend and whether the incentives to switch to a PMS contract were aligned with the aims of 
the introduction of the PMS contract. 
x GPs’ contracts with the NHS determine their gross income – apart from a small number of directly 
employed salaried GPs. Their net income is determined by their gross income and the expenses 
they choose to incur to satisfy their contracts.  By separately examining the factors affecting 
gross income and expenses we can shed some light on the incentives facing GPs and their 
responses to policy. For example, does net income increase with practice size and, if so, is this 
due to the way in which the contract links gross income to size or to economies of scale so that 
expenses increase less than proportionately with size. The latter explanation suggests that 
increases in the average size of practices has generated real cost savings.  
x Part of the rationale for remunerating GPs via capitation fees is that they encourage GPs to 
compete for patients by providing better quality care. But the power of the incentive will depend 
on how net income varies with the number of patients. Hence we investigate whether GPs in 
practices with longer lists per GP have higher net incomes.  
 
 
2. Data and methods 
 
2.1 Data 
 
Our main source of data is a dataset of GPs’ annual income and expenses for the financial year 1
st
 
April 2002 to 31
st
 March 2003 based on anonymised non-disclosive data derived from tax returns held 
by HMRC. The data were collated as part of the EEQ. The incomes data in the HMRC dataset are 
based on Schedule D (self employed) income from all sources. The dataset includes salaried GPs, 
but only those who reported earning Schedule D income only. It does not include GPs who earned 
Schedule E (employment) income.  
 
The data were linked to three other datasets by HMRC statisticians. First, they were linked using 
unique individual GP identifiers to the General Medical Statistics (GMS) database for 2002 (General 
Medical Statistics database, 2008). The GMS database contains detailed information on individual GP 
characteristics and the characteristics of the practices in which they work. Second, practices were 
linked to a dataset of local population characteristics. The limiting long term illness rate, the proportion 
of the population in non-white ethnic groups, and persons per hectare for output areas from the 2001 
Census (Census 2001 database, 2008), and the Index of Multiple Deprivation 2000 (IMD 2000) for 
1998 local authority wards from the Indices of Deprivation 2000 project (Indices of Deprivation for 
wards in England 2000 database, 2008), were attributed to practices based on the proportion of the 
registered practice population resident in each output area/ward based on the 2002 Attribution 
Dataset (Attribution data set of GP registered populations, 2008). Third, practices were linked to area 
type classifications based on the Primary Care Organisation in which every practice was located 
(National Statistics 2001 area classifications for health areas dataset, 2008). The result was a unique, 
anonymised, non-disclosive dataset for statistical analysis containing data on GPs’ annual income 
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and expenses, their individual characteristics, the characteristics of the practices in which they work, 
and characteristics of the local populations and areas.  
 
Access to the anonymised dataset was granted to the researchers for a limited number of analysis 
sessions by statisticians at HMRC at the request of the NHS Confederation and the BMA. The dataset 
was held by statisticians at HMRC and was analysed in their offices. The researchers were required 
to sign and comply with official agreements on data security. They were not allowed to take away the 
data or any results that would have identified individual GPs. The researchers have no further access 
to the data and so are unable to undertake further analyses.  
 
Information on hours worked was taken from the sample of GPs who participated in the 2004 General 
Practitioner Worklife survey, conducted by the National Primary Care Research and Development 
Centre in February 2004 (Whalley et al, 2005; Gravelle and Hole, 2007). A questionnaire was mailed 
to 4,208 GPs in England, of whom 2,261 (54%) responded. The questionnaire covered personal, 
practice and job characteristics, and included questions on hours worked per week.   
 
2.2 Determinants of net income 
 
GP annual net income is defined in the HMRC dataset as gross income (total gross Schedule D 
income from all sources plus professional income not included in the profits of the practice) minus 
expenses (total allowable expenses). We examined the determinants of GP net income, gross income 
and expenses by linear regression of these variables on individual, practice and local population 
characteristics and area type. The covariates were: 
 
1. Individual characteristics: gender; experience (years since qualification); part time status; and, 
country of qualification.  
2. Practice characteristics: list size; partnership size; whether or not the practice is designated as 
a dispensing practice; and, whether or not it has a PMS contract. 
3. Local population characteristics: morbidity (standardised rate of limiting long term illness); 
ethnicity (proportion of the population from an ethnic minority); population density (persons per 
hectare); and, deprivation (IMD 2000).  
4. Area type: “Cities and Services”; “Coastal and Countryside”; “London Centre”; “London 
Cosmopolitan”; “London Suburbs”; “Mining and Manufacturing”; “Prospering UK”. 
 
Since net income is gross income minus expenses, and since the regression model is linear, the 
difference between the coefficients on a variable in the gross income and expense models equals the 
coefficient on the variable in the net income model.  
 
2.3 Estimating wages 
 
While HMRC tax records provide a comprehensive and reliable measure of GP annual gross income 
and expenses, they do not contain data on hours worked. Since income increases with hours worked 
(Gravelle and Hole, 2006) we calculated hourly earnings, or wages.  
 
We used the NPCRDC 2004 GP Worklife survey to predict hours worked for GPs in the HMRC 
dataset. Using the observations from the Worklife survey we regressed hours worked per week on 
socio-demographic, practice and area characteristics.  We started with the set of all variables which 
were common to the Worklife and HMRC datasets. The final set of explanatory variables was derived 
by backwards stepwise regression. We then applied the coefficients estimated on the Worklife dataset 
to the variables in the HMRC dataset to calculate predicted hours worked per week for every GP in 
the HMRC dataset.  
 
We assumed that each GP worked for 47 weeks per year, which is implied by the annual leave 
entitlements usually accorded to GP specialty registrars (British Medical Association, 2007). We 
calculated GP wages by dividing net annual income by predicted yearly hours (predicted weekly 
hours multiplied by 47). 
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2.4 Determinants of wages 
 
We analysed the determinants of GP wages by linear regression of the estimated GP wage variable 
(net annual income/(estimated weekly hours*47)) on the same covariates as those used in the net 
income model. Comparison of the net income model results with the results from the wage model 
indicates whether the pattern of estimated impacts of factors on GP remuneration is robust to the 
specification of remuneration as income or wage. 
 
2.5 Decomposing wage differentials by contract type (GMS versus PMS) 
 
The results from the wage regression shows that GPs in PMS practices earn more than those in GMS 
practices all else equal. We explored these differences in more detail with variants of the Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) of the difference in the mean log wage between 
PMS and GMS GPs.  We ran separate log wage equations for GPs working in PMS and GMS 
practices  
j
i
j
i
j
i
j
i xy HE  log ,  j = 1, 2       (1) 
where i indexes GPs and j indexes contract type ( j  = 1 for PMS, j = 2 for GMS). log y is the natural 
logarithm of the estimated GP wage variable, x is a vector of individual, practice and local population 
characteristics and area types that affect GP wages, E is a vector of coefficients and H is an error 
term. We estimate (1) by least squares so that 
j
i
j
i
j
i xy Eˆlog  .    
 
The difference in mean log wages can be decomposed as  
     1 2 1 2 * 1 1 * 2 * 2ˆ ˆlog log
E U
D y  y x x x xE E E E Eª º       ¬ ¼	
 	
   (2) 
where 
*E  is the vector of coefficients which would be obtained if the two types of GP were treated 
identically (Neumark, 1988).  Neumark (1988) proposed that E* be obtained as the coefficients from 
estimating the model iiii xy HE  log  on pooled data. Other suggestions can be taken as special 
cases of 
* 1 2ˆ ˆ(1 )E OE O E   . Oaxaca (1973) suggested that *E  could be either 1ˆE  or 2ˆE , i.e., O 
=1 or O = 0. Reimers (1983) suggested that O  = 0.5 and Cotton (1988) that  211 nnn  O , where 
jn  is the number of individuals in each group. We present decompositions based on all of these 
specifications of 
*E . 
 
The first term on the right hand side of (2) can be interpreted as the part of the wage differential due 
to differences in the variables or observed characteristics across the two groups weighted by the 
appropriate returns. It is the explained part of the observed differential, E. The second term is the 
unexplained component, U. E provides information about the differences between PMS and GMS 
practices and hence about which kinds of practice were most likely to have switched. For example, 
whether or not PMS practices have more deprived populations. U provides information about the 
incentives for practices of different types to switch.  For example, whether or not the reward for 
switching was higher in practices with more deprived populations. 
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3. Results 
 
3.1 Determinants of net income 
 
The HMRC dataset contains data for 22,222 GPs in England (80% of the total in September 2002; 
NHS Staff 1995-2005 database, 2005). The HMRC dataset had missing values for some of the local 
population characteristics and the final estimation sample size was 21,657. Table I presents summary 
statistics for key variables included in the analyses. The mean annual gross income (std. dev.) was 
£189,327 (£87,112). Mean allowable expenses were £115,631 (£66,502). Mean annual net income 
was £73,696 (£29,450). Summary statistics for the covariates are in the Appendix. Around 80% of 
GPs qualified in the UK, one third were female, the average list per GP was 1,860 patients, and the 
modal partnership size was four.  
 
Table I Variable means and definitions for key variables (N = 21,657) 
Variable  Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. Definition 
Gross income 189,327 87,112 194 3,042,694
Total gross Schedule D income from all sources 
plus professional income not included in the profits 
of the practice 
Expenses 115,631 66,502 107 2,619,664 Total allowable expenses 
Net income 73,696 29,450 87 716,230 Total income minus total allowable expenses 
Predicted 
hours 
44.8 7.8 22.7 56.6 Predicted hours worked per week 
Wage 35.00 12.05 0.06 284.88 Hourly wages (net income/(predicted hours*47) 
Log wage 3.49 0.37 -2.75 5.65 Natural logarithm of hourly wages 
 
Table II reports results from the regressions models for GP gross income, expenses and net income. 
Working in a PMS practice increased net income by £12,500 (17%) per annum because the increase 
in gross income (£41,237) was greater than the increase in expenses (£28,737). GPs in dispensing 
practices had much higher expenses (£87,703) because they purchased the drugs they dispensed; 
but their net income was increased because their gross income increased by (£108,323); they made a 
profit on dispensing. 
 
The coefficient on list per GP in the net income model suggests that for every additional patient per 
GP, gross income increased by £47.60 and expenses increased by £28.40. The combined effect was 
an increase in net income of around £19.20 per additional patient.  The elasticity of net income with 
respect to patients per GP is 0.49. 
 
Figure 1 uses the results from Table II to illustrate the relationship between the numbers of GPs in the 
practice and mean income and expenses per GP, conditional on the other factors included in the 
regression models. Conditional mean income and expenses were computed by fixing the other 
variables in the model at their sample mean values and computing the linear prediction of income and 
expenses for each partnership size. The results show that up to a partnership size of 10 GPs (only 
1.4% of GPs are in larger practices) both gross income and expenses per GP decline with partnership 
size.  Net income does not vary with the size of the practice over this range. 
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Table II Determinants of net income 
 Net income Gross income Expenses 
 Coef. t 
Percentage
effect or  
Elasticity
e 
Coef. t Coef. t 
Female -21,420 -8.43 -29.07% -53,977 -8.51 -32,557 -6.65 
Experience 18,836 19.40 0.10 45,668 15.79 26,832 11.82 
Experience squared -3,459 -16.16  -8,543 -13.33 -5,085 -10.00 
Job share
a 
-37,949 -7.63 -51.49% -10,5166 -8.36 -67,217 -6.90 
Part time
a 
-37,110 -7.57 -50.36% -10,1038 -8.27 -63,928 -6.77 
Qualified: non-UK Europe
b 
-1,639 -1.47 -2.22% -5,004 -1.51 -3,365 -1.27 
Qualified: rest of world
b 
-880 -1.48 -1.19% -12,585 -7.53 -11,705 -8.78 
List per GP/1000 19,259 22.72 0.49 47,643 23.11 28,383 18.05 
Partnership size: 2
c
 5,959 5.46 8.09% -1,747 -0.51 -7,706 -2.75 
Partnership size: 3
c
 6,376 6.02 8.65% -5,404 -1.60 -11,781 -4.24 
Partnership size: 4
c
 6,456 5.96 8.76% -10,806 -3.17 -17,263 -6.13 
Partnership size: 5
c
 6,578 5.72 8.93% -14,588 -4.06 -21,166 -7.14 
Partnership size: 6
c
 6,215 5.11 8.43% -17,701 -4.66 -23,915 -7.66 
Partnership size: 7
c
 5,214 3.96 7.07% -20,334 -4.98 -25,547 -7.65 
Partnership size: 8
c
 4,144 2.92 5.62% -27,313 -6.25 -31,457 -8.80 
Partnership size: 9
c
 6,020 3.70 8.17% -24,633 -5.01 -30,653 -7.73 
Partnership size: 10
c 
 1,149 0.59 1.56% -34,345 -6.00 -35,494 -7.84 
Partnership size: 11
c
 4,171 2.03 5.66% -19,831 -2.79 -24,002 -4.05 
Partnership size: 12
c 
 -6,143 -2.34 -8.34% -96,906 -13.21 -90,763 -15.63 
Partnership size: 13
c 
 -1,450 -0.40 -1.97% -49,810 -3.77 -48,360 -4.19 
Partnership size: 14
c 
 3,783 1.09 5.13% -55,448 -5.56 -59,231 -6.18 
Partnership size: 15
c 
 -10,884 -2.80 -14.77% -71,676 -7.47 -60,792 -8.91 
Partnership size: 16
c 
 20,891 4.50 28.35% -21,604 -2.01 -42,495 -5.91 
Dispensing practice 20,620 27.40 27.98% 108,324 43.97 87,703 43.94 
PMS practice 12,500 14.72 16.96% 41,237 19.28 28,737 17.40 
Limiting long term illness -7,841 -5.56 -0.10 -32,581 -8.03 -24,740 -7.65 
Ethnic minorities 15,884 6.18 0.02 25,942 4.34 10,058 2.12 
Population density -34 -2.45 -0.01 -239 -6.36 -205 -7.24 
IMD 2000 47 3.03 0.02 139 3.37 92 2.82 
“Cities and Services”
d 
 564 0.38 0.77% -35,258 -8.91 -35,822 -11.61 
“Coastal and Countryside”
d 
2,643 1.54 3.59% -20,505 -4.56 -23,147 -6.67 
“London Cosmopolitan”
d 
 1,500 0.91 2.04% -14,398 -3.39 -15,899 -4.64 
“London Suburbs”
d 
 791 0.49 1.07% -29,173 -7.09 -29,964 -9.32 
“Mining  Manufacturing”
d 
 1,602 0.96 2.17% -37,923 -8.66 -39,525 -11.66 
“Prospering UK”
d 
 2,282 1.40 3.10% -31,115 -7.33 -33,397 -10.19 
Constant 78,929 4.39  298,846 6.55 219,917 6.19 
N 21,657 21,657 21,657 
2R  0.4073 0.4380 0.3875 
Controls are also included but not shown for whether or not a return was made to HMRC in quarter 4, whether or 
not HMRC data were available or all GPs in the practice, and very small list size. The t-values are based on 
robust standard errors. 
a
 The omitted category is “Full time”. 
b 
The omitted category is “Qualified: UK”. 
c
 The omitted category is 
“Partnership size: 1”. 
d
 The omitted category is “London Centre”. 
e
 For dummy variables the percentage effect is 
calculated as 100*coefficient/mean net income; for continuous variables the elasticity is calculated as 
(coefficient*variable mean)/mean net income.
 
For the experience variables the elasticity is calculated as the sum 
of the elasticities for experience and experience squared evaluated at the mean experience. 
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Figure 1 Conditional mean gross income, expenses, and net income (£ per annum per GP) by partnership size calculated at the sample mean values of the 
covariates 
8    CHE Research Paper 36 
3.2 Hours worked 
 
The model used to predict GP hours is in Table III (additional models of the hours of work of the GPs 
in the Worklife survey which used all the available Worklife survey variables are reported in Gravelle 
and Hole, 2007). The coefficients from the analysis of weekly hours worked in the Worklife survey 
sample are plausibly signed. Full time GPs work 13.5 hours (30%) more than part-timers. Female 
GPs work 6.9 hours less than male GPs, even after allowing for the fact that female GPs are more 
likely to be part time. GPs in practices with more patients per GP work more hours, whereas 
conditional on this, those in practices serving larger populations work fewer hours.  
 
Table III also has summary statistics for the covariates used to estimate hours worked in both the 
Worklife survey dataset and the HMRC dataset. The characteristics are similar in both datasets, 
except for the smaller proportion of salaried GPs in the Worklife survey (the salaried GP figures in the 
HMRC dataset include PMS GPs grouped as ‘contracted or salaried’, where it is not possible to 
distinguish whether or not they are salaried (GP Earnings and Expenses Enquiry, 2008). The actual 
and predicted hours worked per week are also reported. The mean values in the two datasets are 
similar, with a larger standard deviation in the Worklife survey because these are actual observations 
of hours worked, which include idiosyncratic error terms.   
 
Table III Model used to predict GP hours 
 
2004 General Practitioner Worklife survey dataset 
(N = 1,825) 
HMRC dataset  
(N = 22,222) 
 Regression model Summary statistics Summary statistics
 Coef. t 
Percentage 
effect or 
elasticity
a 
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Female -6.872 -11.15 -15.44% 0.340 0.474 0.336 0.472 
Full time 13.523 19.03 30.38% 0.795 0.404 0.804 0.397 
List per GP / 1,000 2.686 3.47 0.08 1.648 0.685 1.851 0.495 
(List per GP / 1,000) squared -0.177 -3.19  3.187 7.280 3.672 2.460 
Dispensing 1.474 2.48 3.31% 0.185 0.389 0.146 0.353 
10% of GPs with most deprived 
patients 
-1.957 -1.75 -0.00 0.069 0.254 0.088 0.284 
Salaried -2.130 -1.7 -4.78% 0.025 0.157 0.206
b 
0.404
b
Practice list size / 1,000 -0.214 -3.7 -0.04 8.962 4.524 8.337 4.200 
Constant 34.091 27.39      
R2 0.3700    
Hours worked per week  44.520
c
 12.910
c
 44.790
d 
 4.200
d
 
The t-values are based on robust standard errors. 
a 
Percentage effect is calculated for dummy variables as 100*coefficient/mean hours; for continuous variables 
elasticity is calculated as (coefficient*variable mean)/mean hours. For list per GP/1000 the elasticity is calculated 
as the sum of the elasticities on list per GP/1000 and on (list per GP/1000) squared evaluated at the mean of list 
per GP. 
b
 This includes PMS GPs grouped as ‘contracted or salaried’, where it is not possible to distinguish 
whether or not they are salaried. 
c 
Actual. 
d 
Predicted. 
 
3.3 Determinants of GP wages  
 
Mean (std. dev.) hourly wages per GP, were £35.00 (£12.05) (Table I). The results from the wage 
regression are in Table IV. Female GPs had significantly lower wages than male GPs, though the 
magnitude of the difference was quite small at just over 2%. The relationship between experience and 
wages is inverse U-shaped, with the maximum occurring 27 years after qualifying. The coefficients on 
part-time and job share working are not significant: GPs had the same average reward for hours 
worked whether full or part time. Having overseas qualifications had only a small and statistically 
insignificant negative effect on the wage. 
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Table IV Determinants of wages 
 Coef. t 
Percentage effect or 
Elasticity
e 
Female -0.743 -4.11 -2.12% 
Experience 8.708 19.06 0.10
 
Experience squared -1.586 -15.89  
Job share
a
 -0.668 -0.96 -1.91% 
Part time
a
 0.440 1.77 1.26% 
Qualified: non-UK Europe
b
 -0.772 -1.38 -2.21% 
Qualified: rest of world
b
 -0.356 -1.33 -1.02% 
List per GP/1000 6.893 24.45 0.37 
Partnership size: 2
c
 3.393 7.27 9.69% 
Partnership size: 3
c
 4.118 9.18 11.77% 
Partnership size: 4
c
 4.638 10.50 13.25% 
Partnership size: 5
c
 5.169 11.47 14.77% 
Partnership size: 6
c
 5.489 12.05 15.68% 
Partnership size: 7
c
 5.447 11.50 15.56% 
Partnership size: 8
c
 5.522 10.84 15.78% 
Partnership size: 9
c
 7.120 11.90 20.34% 
Partnership size: 10
c 
 5.052 6.86 14.43% 
Partnership size: 11
c
 7.467 8.75 21.33% 
Partnership size: 12
c 
 3.072 3.00 8.78% 
Partnership size: 13
c 
 7.931 4.13 22.66% 
Partnership size: 14
c 
 8.372 4.50 23.92% 
Partnership size: 15
c 
 3.033 1.68 8.67% 
Partnership size: 16
c 
 22.199 15.79 63.43% 
Dispensing practice 7.420 30.24 21.20% 
PMS practice 8.618 38.73 24.62% 
Limiting long term illness -3.128 -4.75 -0.09 
Ethnic minorities 8.739 7.72 0.02 
Population density -0.014 -2.28 -0.01 
IMD 2000 0.030 4.18 0.02 
“Cities and Services”
d 
 -0.371 -0.53 -1.06% 
“Coastal and Countryside”
d 
 0.426 0.53 1.22% 
“London Cosmopolitan”
d 
 0.342 0.44 0.98% 
“London Suburbs”
d 
 -0.407 -0.55 -1.16% 
“Mining  Manufacturing”
d 
 -0.038 -0.05 -0.11% 
“Prospering UK”
d 
 0.459 0.61 1.31% 
Constant 5.644 4.38  
N 21,657 
2R  0.2179 
Controls are also included but not shown for whether or not a return was made to HMRC in quarter 4, whether or 
not HMRC data were available or all GPs in the practice, and very small list size. The t-values are based on 
robust standard errors. 
a
 The omitted category is “Full time”. 
b 
The omitted category is “Qualified: UK”. 
c
 The omitted category is 
“Partnership size: 1”. 
d
 The omitted category is “London Centre”. 
e
 For dummy variables the percentage effect is 
calculated as 100*coefficient/mean wage; for continuous variables the elasticity is calculated as 
(coefficient*variable mean)/mean wage.
 
For the experience variables the elasticity is calculated as the sum of the 
elasticities on experience and experience squared evaluated at the mean experience. 
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PMS GPs earned significantly higher wages than GMS GPs, with a wage premium of £8.62 (25%). 
Working in a dispensing practice also had a large (21%) positive effect on wages. 
 
More patients per GP led to higher wages (elasticity 0.37).  This is to be expected given that a large 
component of GP income varies directly with the number of patients on the list. Conditional on list size 
and the other covariates, single handed GPs have the lowest wages: for example GPs in practices 
with two GPs have 9.7% higher wages all else equal.  
 
There were higher wages for GPs working in more deprived areas (higher values of the IMD 2000 
indicate greater deprivation), in more rural areas, or areas with larger proportions of the population 
from ethnic minorities. GPs in practices in areas with sicker populations had smaller wages. 
Conditional on the other covariates there were no statistically significant wage differentials associated 
with the ONS area type.   
 
The pattern of effects (signs, significance and percentage effects) of the covariates on wages (Table 
IV) is broadly similar to their effect on net income (Table II), indicating that the estimated impacts of 
the covariates are robust to the specification of remuneration. The main differences are with the 
effects of the female, and the part-time variables. Being female and being part-time reduced both 
wages and net income but the effects are much greater in the net income model: female GPs earn 
2% lower wages than male GPs, earn 29% lower net income than male GPs, and work 15% fewer 
hours; part-time GPs earn around 2% lower wages than full time GPs, around 50% lower net income 
and work around 30% few hours. For both females and part-time GPs, wages are only slightly lower 
than those of the comparator, but the net income is much lower. The former is a function of the lower 
net income combined with the lower hours worked. 
 
3.4 Decomposing wage differentials by contract type (GMS versus PMS) 
 
The log wage models used in the decomposition are in Table V. The main difference between the 
models for PMS and GMS GPs is that in the PMS model, gender has no significant effect on log 
wages, while female GMS GPs earn significantly lower wages than their male counterparts. 
Compared with PMS GPs who work full time, those working on a job share or part-time basis have no 
significant wage penalty, while for GMS GPs the effects are significant and negative.  
 
The summary results of the decompositions are in the top panel of Table VI. This shows how different 
assumptions about the appropriate comparator coefficients (E*) affect the apportionment of the overall 
differential between the explained (due to differences in mean characteristics) and unexplained (due 
to differences in coefficients) portions. The decomposition into explained and unexplained portions is 
sensitive to the value of the comparator coefficients E*, with the explained component sometimes 
negative and sometimes positive. However, the unexplained component accounts for in excess of 
90% of the overall difference in all cases. Hence, whatever the basis of the decomposition, the 
majority of the higher mean log wage in PMS practices is attributable to the differential effect of the 
characteristics on wages, not to differences in the characteristics of GPs in PMS and GMS practices. 
 
The implication of these findings is that the higher observed wages of PMS GPs in the sample is 
mainly explained by their superior returns to individual, practice and local population characteristics 
and area types. A GP working in a PMS practice with identical characteristics to a GP working in a 
GMS practice would have earned considerably higher wages than the GMS GP. PMS contracts were 
negotiated with local PCTs. We can therefore interpret the difference between the effects of 
characteristics on wages as showing how GP bargaining power varied with the characteristics. 
 
The PMS contract was intended to encourage the supply of GP services to under served classes of 
patients. Comparison of the mean population and area characteristics for PMS and GMS GPs in 
Tables V and VI show that PMS GPs are more likely to be in practices with slightly more patients per 
GP and where populations are sicker, more deprived and have a higher proportion from ethnic 
minorities. The detailed decompositions in the lower part of Table VI suggest that the financial 
incentives are rather mixed. The gain from switching to PMS is greater the larger the number of 
patients per GP in the practice. The rewards from being in a PMS contract rather than a GMS contract 
are also higher in less densely populated areas, in areas with more deprived patients and with a 
higher proportion of patients from ethnic minorities. But the rewards are smaller for PMS practices in 
areas with sicker populations. 
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Table V. Log wage models by contract type (GMS versus PMS). 
 PMS GMS Pooled 
 Coef. t Mean xE g Coef. t Mean xE g Coef. t 
Female -0.022 -1.37 0.32 -0.007 -0.022 -3.96 0.338 -0.008 -0.026 -4.55 
Experience 0.365 8.59 2.243 0.819 0.292 19.85 2.233 0.652 0.321 21.51 
Experience squared -0.067 -7.40 5.664 -0.379 -0.054 -16.88 5.655 -0.303 -0.060 -18.57
Job share
a
 -0.014 -0.27 0.017 0.000 -0.057 -2.91 0.015 -0.001 -0.037 -1.91 
Part time
a
 0.014 0.69 0.174 0.002 -0.016 -2.18 0.178 -0.003 -0.003 -0.44 
Qualified: non-UK Europe
b
 -0.025 -0.47 0.015 0.000 -0.018 -0.95 0.016 0.000 -0.026 -1.37 
Qualified: rest of world
b
 -0.004 -0.20 0.176 -0.001 -0.010 -1.27 0.147 -0.002 -0.006 -0.81 
List per GP/1000 0.248 18.82 1.911 0.474 0.188 30.96 1.840 0.346 0.215 37.63 
Partnership size: 2
c
 0.185 6.13 0.106 0.02 0.106 9.17 0.107 0.011 0.123 10.73 
Partnership size: 3
c
 0.249 7.91 0.111 0.028 0.155 13.38 0.135 0.021 0.169 14.54 
Partnership size: 4
c
 0.242 7.78 0.149 0.036 0.188 16.30 0.173 0.032 0.197 17.11 
Partnership size: 5
c
 0.310 10.15 0.172 0.053 0.196 16.67 0.166 0.033 0.221 19.03 
Partnership size: 6
c
 0.333 10.32 0.129 0.043 0.214 17.70 0.143 0.031 0.233 19.36 
Partnership size: 7
c
 0.320 9.06 0.087 0.028 0.216 16.74 0.096 0.021 0.233 18.06 
Partnership size: 8
c
 0.336 9.04 0.072 0.024 0.218 15.11 0.058 0.013 0.248 17.36 
Partnership size: 9
c
 0.411 9.14 0.034 0.014 0.238 12.82 0.024 0.006 0.288 15.96 
Partnership size: 10
c 
 0.318 4.76 0.011 0.004 0.207 8.19 0.011 0.002 0.231 9.18 
Partnership size: 11
c
 0.474 6.33 0.009 0.004 0.264 7.94 0.006 0.001 0.326 10.28 
Partnership size: 12
c 
 0.274 1.93 0.002 0.001 0.171 3.17 0.002 0.000 0.217 4.06 
Partnership size: 13
c 
 0.442 5.52 0.008 0.003 0.149 2.34 0.001 0.000 0.362 7.73 
Partnership size: 14
c 
 0.408 4.08 0.005 0.002 
f f f f 
0.463 6.04 
Partnership size: 15
c 
 0.251 2.83 0.006 0.002 
f f f f 
0.334 4.93 
Partnership size: 16
c 
 0.663 5.35 0.003 0.002 
f f f f 
0.742 7.65 
Dispensing practice 
e e
 
e
 
e
 0.213 30.26 0.184 0.039 0.159 21.15 
Limiting long term illness -0.113 -2.06 1.025 -0.116 -0.052 -2.39 0.975 -0.05 -0.055 -2.59 
Ethnic minorities 0.271 3.47 0.093 0.025 0.252 7.43 0.079 0.02 0.224 6.96 
Population density 0.000 -0.94 29.949 -0.013 0.000 -0.37 27.236 -0.002 -0.001 -2.78 
IMD 2000 0.001 1.78 26.385 0.028 0.001 2.32 23.246 0.013 0.001 2.90 
“Cities and Services”
d 
 -0.035 -0.53 0.269 -0.009 0.033 1.57 0.233 0.008 0.011 0.50 
“Coastal and Countryside”
d 
 0.047 0.65 0.078 0.004 0.034 1.41 0.091 0.003 0.024 0.99 
“London Cosmopolitan”
d 
 0.106 1.65 0.046 0.005 -0.061 -2.74 0.024 -0.001 0.028 1.26 
“London Suburbs”
d 
 0.034 0.51 0.066 0.002 -0.022 -1.00 0.047 -0.001 0.003 0.15 
“Mining  Manufacturing”
d 
 0.009 0.12 0.213 0.002 0.030 1.28 0.132 0.004 0.024 1.02 
“Prospering UK”
d 
 0.035 0.51 0.314 0.011 0.040 1.78 0.448 0.018 0.019 0.84 
Constant 2.509 24.76 1.000 2.509 2.526 68.60 1.000 2.526 2.523 69.02 
Sum    3.644    3.457   
N 4,474 17,183 21,657 
2R  0.1326 0.1581 0.1336 
Controls are also included but not shown for whether or not a return was made to HMRC in quarter 4, whether or 
not HMRC data were available or all GPs in the practice, and very small list size. The t-values are based on 
robust standard errors. 
a
 The omitted category is “Full time”. 
b 
The omitted category is “Qualified: UK”. 
c
 The omitted category is 
“Partnership size: 1”. 
d
 The omitted category is “London Centre”. 
e
 There are no PMS practices designated as 
dispensing practices in the data. 
f
 There are no GMS practices with more than 13 partners in the data. 
g E = 
coefficient multiplied by mean value.  
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Table VI. Decomposition log wage differentials by contract type (GMS versus PMS). 
Summary of decomposition 
 O = 0 
*
ˆ( )E E GMS  
O = 1 
*
ˆ( )E E PMS  
  O  = 0.5 
*
ˆ ˆ
2
E EE  
PMS GMS
 
O = 0.207a  Pooledb 
Explained  -0.028 0.017 -0.005 -0.018 0.002 
Unexplained 0.215 0.170 0.193 0.206 0.186 
Total difference 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.188 
Decomposition by variable  (O = 0, * ˆ )E E GMS  
 
Explained 
ˆ( )PMS GMS GMSx x E
 
Unexplained 
ˆ ˆ( )PMS PMS GMSx E E
 
Total difference 
( ˆ ˆ )PMS PMS GMS GMSx xE E  
Female 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Experience 0.003 0.164 0.167 
Experience squared -0.001 -0.076 -0.077 
Job share 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Part time 0.000 0.005 0.005 
Qualified: non-UK Europe 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Qualified: rest of world 0.000 0.001 0.001 
List per GP/1000 0.013 0.115 0.128 
Partnership size: 2 0.000 0.009 0.009 
Partnership size: 3 -0.004 0.011 0.007 
Partnership size: 4 -0.004 0.008 0.004 
Partnership size: 5 0.001 0.020 0.021 
Partnership size: 6 -0.003 0.015 0.012 
Partnership size: 7 -0.002 0.009 0.007 
Partnership size: 8 0.003 0.009 0.012 
Partnership size: 9 0.002 0.006 0.008 
Partnership size: 10 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Partnership size: 11 0.001 0.002 0.003 
Partnership size: 12 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Partnership size: 13 0.001 0.002 0.003 
Partnership size: 14 0.000 0.002 0.002 
Partnership size: 15 0.000 0.002 0.002 
Partnership size: 16 0.000 0.002 0.002 
Dispensing practice -0.039 0.000 -0.039 
Limiting long term illness rate -0.003 -0.063 -0.066 
Ethnic minorities 0.004 0.002 0.006 
Population density 0.000 -0.011 -0.011 
IMD 2000 0.002 0.014 0.016 
“Cities and Services” 0.001 -0.018 -0.017 
“Coastal and Countryside” 0.000 0.001 0.001 
“London Cosmopolitan” -0.001 0.008 0.007 
“London Suburbs” 0.000 0.004 0.004 
“Mining and Manufacturing” 0.002 -0.005 -0.003 
“Prospering UK” -0.005 -0.001 -0.006 
Constant 0.000 -0.017 -0.017 
Sum -0.028 0.215 0.188 
Numbers may not add due to rounding error.  
a O = frequency weight for PMS GPs = (number of PMS GPs in the sample)/(total number of GPs in the sample). b 
The appropriate returns are based on the pooled log wage model in Table V. 
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4. Concluding remarks 
 
4.1 Caveats 
 
Our study has several limitations. First, the HMRC data only includes Schedule D (i.e., self-employed) 
income. We were unable to include salaried GPs who earned Schedule E (employment) income in the 
analysis. Second, since the HMRC does not hold data on hours worked by GPs, we had to use hours 
predicted from the NPCRDC sample survey of GPs which only has information on a subset of the 
variables in the HMRC data set. Third, we were unable to find reliable evidence on the number of 
weeks worked per annum by GPs and, in particular, on the way in which this might vary with GP 
characteristics. We therefore assumed that all GPs work the same number of weeks. If, for example, 
PMS GPs work fewer or more weeks per annum than GMS GPs then our results may under or 
overestimate the PMS wage premium. Fourth, our analysis is based on HMRC data for the financial 
year 2002/3 and so does not reflect the changes in the GMS and PMS contracts which occurred in 
2004. Fifth, one explanation for the wage premium to PMS contracts is the self-selection of high 
wage-earning GMS GPs into the PMS group. Practices were more likely to opt for the PMS contract if 
they had been fundholders in the internal market (Gravelle and Hann, 2006), suggesting that PMS 
practices were more entrepreneurial than GMS GPs (Whynes, Ennew, and Feigham, 1999). But this 
does not mean that the PMS wage premium is due to GP characteristics rather than the contract 
itself: more entrepreneurial GPs are likely to be better at recognising opportunities for greater income 
and to be more willing to switch. Sixth, because of the restrictions placed on the researchers to 
ensure data confidentiality, only a limited set of analyses could be undertaken. 
 
Despite these caveats, because of the richness of the dataset our results have some potentially 
important implications for policy.  
 
4.2 Potential policy implications 
 
Discrimination. Female GPs have markedly lower incomes than otherwise similar male GPs but their 
wages are only slightly lower. Thus, once allowance is made for hours worked, there seems little 
evidence of gender discrimination in these data. Our analysis also suggests that there is no evidence 
for pay discrimination against overseas qualified GPs.  
 
Economies of scale. Compared to GPs in practices with the modal number of GPs (four) single 
handed GPs have 7% lower wages and 9% smaller incomes. This may explain the gradual decline in 
the proportion of single handed practices from 32% in 1994 to 27% in 2004. Holding other factors, 
especially patients per GP, constant, expenses per GP decline steadily with the number of GPs over 
most of the range of observed practice sizes (see Figure 1). Increasing the number of GPs and 
patients pro rata will reduce costs per GP and per patient served. However, once there are two GPs 
or more in a practice, gross income per GP fell at the same rate as practice expenses, so that there is 
no financial incentive for GPs to further increase practice size. Whether the incentives for choice of 
partnership size are appropriate depends on how the overall output of practices varies with size.  
There is some evidence that both patient satisfaction (Crow et al, 2002) and clinical quality (Doran et 
al, 2006; Gravelle, Sutton and Ma, 2008) decline with practice size.  Thus there may be too great an 
incentive for GPs to increase their practice size. 
 
Incentives for competition for patients. Both GP wages and net income are responsive to the number 
of patients per GP (elasticities of 0.37 and 0.49, respectively): GPs appear to have an incentive to 
compete for patients.  
 
Compensating differentials. There were higher wages and net incomes for GPs working in more 
deprived areas, rural areas, or areas with a larger proportion of the population from ethnic minorities, 
but GPs in practices in areas with sicker populations had smaller wages and net incomes. The effects 
on wages were typically small with wage elasticities between -0.9 and 0.02. There were no significant 
wage differentials associated with the ONS area type. The results suggest that pay is not greatly 
affected by area characteristics, so that the relative supply of GPs in areas has not been affected by 
relative geographical pay differentials. This is consistent with other findings (see, e.g., Elliott et al., 
2006) and suggests that area differences in supply are driven by non-pay factors.  
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PMS versus GMS contracts. Practices with PMS contracts were expected to provide more services 
for their patients. The fact that their expenses are higher by around £28,700 per GP suggests that 
they may have done so. But, as Table II shows, their gross incomes are greater by £41,200 per GP, 
leading to higher net income (17% higher) and higher wages (25%). Thus PMS GPs seem to have 
been overcompensated for the additional costs they incur. PMS contracts were meant to increase the 
supply of services to under served groups of patients. The decomposition of the differences in log 
wages between PMS and GMS GPs in Table VI shows that the financial incentives for switching from 
GMS to PMS may not have been well aligned with the policy objective. GPs with sicker patients and in 
more densely population areas would have a reduced wage if they switched to PMS. On the other 
hand they would have a higher wage from switching if they were in practices with fewer GPs per 
patient or with more deprived patients.  
 
As the example of the ONS Longitudinal Survey (2008) demonstrates, it is possible to use datasets 
containing potentially sensitive data whilst preserving confidentiality. Our study shows the potential 
usefulness of an anonymised, non-disclosive dataset derived from GP tax returns to address a 
number of important policy questions. We recommend that, in the interests of improved policy making, 
datasets on income such as the one used in our study should, with appropriate safeguards, be made 
available for future use by researchers. 
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Appendix Variable means and definitions for covariates (N = 21,657) 
Variable  Mean Definition  
Female 0.334 Female = 1, 0 otherwise 
Experience 2.235 Years since qualified/10 
Experience squared 5.658 Years since qualified squared/100 
Full time 0.804 Full-time contract = 1, 0 otherwise 
Job share 0.016 Job share contract = 1, 0 otherwise 
Part time 0.181 Part-time contract = 1, 0 otherwise 
Qualified: UK 0.831 Qualified in UK = 1, 0 otherwise 
Qualified: non–UK Europe 0.016 Qualified in Europe outside UK = 1, 0 otherwise 
Qualified: rest of world 0.153 Qualified outside Europe = 1, 0 otherwise 
List per GP/1000 1.856 Patient registrations per partner in practice/1000 
Partnership size: 1 0.083 1 partner in practice = 1, 0 otherwise 
Partnership size: 2 0.107 2 partners in practice = 1, 0 otherwise 
Partnership size: 3 0.131 3 partners in practice = 1, 0 otherwise 
Partnership size: 4 0.168 4 partners in practice = 1, 0 otherwise 
Partnership size: 5 0.167 5 partners in practice = 1, 0 otherwise 
Partnership size: 6 0.139 6 partners in practice = 1, 0 otherwise 
Partnership size: 7 0.094 7 partners in practice = 1, 0 otherwise 
Partnership size: 8 0.061 8 partners in practice = 1, 0 otherwise 
Partnership size: 9 0.026 9 partners in practice = 1, 0 otherwise 
Partnership size: 10 0.011 10 partners in practice = 1, 0 otherwise 
Partnership size: 11 0.006 11 partners in practice = 1, 0 otherwise 
Partnership size: 12 0.002 12 partners in practice = 1, 0 otherwise 
Partnership size: 13 0.003 13 partners in practice = 1, 0 otherwise 
Partnership size: 14 0.001 14 partners in practice = 1, 0 otherwise 
Partnership size: 15 0.001 15 partners in practice = 1, 0 otherwise 
Partnership size: 16 0.001 16 partners in practice = 1, 0 otherwise 
Dispensing practice 0.146 Dispensing practice = 1, 0 otherwise 
PMS practice 0.207 PMS practice = 1, 0 otherwise 
Limiting long term illness rate 0.985 Standardised limiting longstanding illness rate 
 
Ethnic minorities 0.082 Proportion of population from non-white ethnic groups  
Population density 28.091 Persons per hectare
 
IMD 2000 23.917 IMD 2000 score
 
“Cities and Services” 0.241 ONS area: “Cities and Services” = 1, 0 otherwise
 
“Coastal and Countryside” 0.088 ONS area: “Coastal and Countryside” = 1, 0 otherwise
 
“London Centre” 0.023 ONS area: “London Centre” = 1, 0 otherwise
 
“London Cosmopolitan” 0.029 ONS area: “London Cosmopolitan” = 1, 0 otherwise
 
“London Suburbs” 0.051 ONS area: “London Suburbs” = 1, 0 otherwise
 
“Mining and Manufacturing” 0.150 ONS area: “Mining and Manufacturing” = 1, 0 otherwise
 
“Prospering UK” 0.419 ONS area: “Prospering UK” = 1, 0 otherwise
 
We also include controls for whether or not a tax return was made to HMRC in quarter 4, whether or not HMRC 
data were available or all GPs in the practice, and very small list size. 
 
 
 
 
